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APPENDIX A
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SYMPOSIUM
THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Our symposium focuses on intellectual property law to examine how
and why nations, and private parties within nations, change in response to
evolving international standards, and how those international standards are
in turn influenced by the compliance experiences of nations. Because the
TRIPS obligations become mandatory for 70 developing countries next
year, and because preparation for the millennium round of new trade
negotiations includes intellectual property issues, analyzing the forces that
influence the shape of private, national, and international standards will
help us understand how intellectual property rights are likely to evolve.
OUTCOMES
We anticipate several concrete outcomes from this symposium. From
an academic perspective, we hope to forge a stronger link between the field
of intellectual property, on the one hand, and more general theories from
international law, economics, and political science about why and how
nations and private parties comply with law. We expect this cross-
fertilization to enrich both disciplines. For example, we anticipate that the
symposium will bring new insights into international compliance analysis
by adding perspectives about intellectual property to the compliance
literature from other subject areas. For intellectual property scholars, we
hope that the symposium will provide insight about how legal regimes in
other fields work to bring about compliance, and how institutions and
norms affect compliance.
From a practical standpoint, we expect all entities in the international
intellectual property field to find helpful insights through the symposium.
Rights holders should discover workable strategies for maximizing
compliance, allowing them to choose, for example, between strategies built
on enforcement and those built on education.
Potential holders of newly devised rights should find strategies that
link compliance to evolving standards.
Intellectual property consumers and competitors should better
understand the effective limits of intellectual property rights.
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Government officials responsible for intellectual property systems
should get insight that helps them understand, and maneuver within, the
domestic and international pressures they face.
FRAMEWORK FOR THE SYMPOSIUM
Our primary interest is in identifying the forces that shape the
development of national regimes and private conduct in the light of
evolving international standards. In short, we seek to identify the variables
that cause a nation or an individual to comply with international intellectual
property standards.
We have developed this framework document to suggest the essential
considerations that we believe underlie the symposium, to articulate the
various forces that might be at work, and to provide an integrating
framework that we hope will allow disparate perspectives to be related to
one another. It is our hope that the authors and commentators for the
symposium can relate their work to this framework and improve our
understanding of the framework and the underlying relationships.
The framework is built around three central characteristics that we find
in intellectual property law, and two perspectives that we think must be
brought to bear in organizing analysis in this field.
Three Central Characteristics of Intellectual Property Enforcement
The three central characteristics are the following:
1. States create intellectual property rights, and create the enforcement
machinery that defines and vindicates those rights, including institutions
and processes that facilitate private enforcement. However, by and large
states have not taken an active role in enforcing rights. The sheriff is
available to seize counterfeit goods when they are identified, but few law
enforcement agencies have a mandate or a plan for intercepting and
suppressing counterfeit or infringing goods. (One possible exception to this
characteristic is that governments are taking an increasingly proactive
stance to interdict the international theft of trade secrets of great national
value. And if a state agency is the thief, special problems of state
responsibility arise.)
2. Even in developed countries, enforcement is left up to private
parties. Generally, rights holders (or organizations of rights holders) bear
the expense of monitoring infringement, initiating action, and directing the
dispute resolution process. The degree of enforcement in any system is
therefore related to the incentive that a rights holder has to enforce its
rights, the cost of that enforcement, and the benefits of enforcement. In all
countries, many violations of intellectual property rights go unaddressed
because rights holders do not find it worthwhile to bear the cost of detection
and prosecution.
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3. Compliance is enhanced when private parties internalize the values
that underlie the norms. Self-enforcement occurs when private parties
accept the obligation to comply and adjust their conduct accordingly, even
when the threat of sanctions for non-compliance is not significant. When a
professor thinks about how much copyrighted material to copy for class, the
professor is responding to an internal law enforcement impulse that
enhances compliance.
These three factors suggest an uneasy relationship between
international law and national responsibility, one that is driven by the
difference between compliance by nations and compliance by private
parties. Does state responsibility stop with setting up the rights and the
machinery of enforcement (which is now required by TRIPS)? Or, should
the state also be responsible for lowering the cost of private enforcement,
initiating state enforcement, or effectuating the norm internalization of
private parties within the country? In short, what should be the state's
responsibility for private conduct concerning intellectual property?
Two Analytical Perspectives
To recognize the interrelationship between state and private
responsibility for intellectual property compliance, we envision that two
analytical perspectives will be helpful.
The first analytical perspective is cost-benefit analysis. Under this
view, a country will adjust its regime when the perceived costs of doing so
are less then the perceived benefits. This perspective seeks to identify the
various costs and benefits that a country will face when deciding its policy
toward intellectual property. This framework, which is applicable primarily
to analyzing state conduct, forces us to articulate the variables that
determine how states act to fulfill their responsibility and assess the relative
weight of the variables. A cost-benefit perspective could also be applied to
international standards and private conduct.
The second analytical perspective is what we might call the
"internalization" perspective. The internalization perspective requires
greater attention in the compliance literature. It relates initially to
compliance by private actors. This perspective seeks to identify the factors
that determine whether and how international and national standards
become internalized and guide private conduct. Why do individual agents
comply with the law and what factors enhance their compliance? What is it
about a standard that makes people want to comply with it? Under what
circumstances do they see compliance as beneficial and in what
circumstances is compliance a matter of coercion? This perspective looks
at private compliance, but it can also enrich our understanding of standards
at the national and international levels. At an international level, we might
consider acceptance of the fundamental models of intellectual property to
be significant in the process of negotiating the scope of rights. At the state
level, internalization implicates issues of state responsibility. What is the
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state's responsibility with regard to helping private entities internalize
norms? What is the relationship between domestic law and the way it is
enforced that promotes self-enforcement of law by private parties?
These two perspectives - the cost-benefit perspective and the
internalization perspective-are interlinked and potentially complementary.
We have tried to capture that interlinkage by integrating issues of norm
internalization with our list of costs and benefits of intellectual property.
The ability of a country to have a strong intellectual property regime may
vary with the acceptance of intellectual property norms by the people of the
country. Acceptance or internalization by powerful political constituencies
therefore becomes a benefit of (or a lower cost of) intellectual property to
the state. Analogously, the strength of private norm internalization may
depend on the message that private parties receive from the state through
legislation, enforcement, or political leadership. The state may therefore be
instrumental in lowering opposition to intellectual property by showing its
benefits, which changes the cost-benefit analysis for the state.
OUTLINE OF THE COMPLIANCE FACTORS
Below we suggest the costs and benefits of compliance in a general
form and in a way that integrates notions of private internalization with
traditional measures of costs and benefits to the state. We have organized
the outline to reflect an external/internal distinction. External (or
transnational) forces are those forces outside a country that provide (or are
thought to provide) opportunities for compliant states or that impose costs
on non-compliant states. For example, countries face costs from the
prospect that foreign countries will close their markets if laws are not
changed. Conversely, countries face potential external benefits from
enhanced intellectual property protection, including, perhaps, enhanced
international stature, the ability to attract investment, and greater bargaining
power in future negotiations.
The internal dimension includes those factors inside a country that
shape its willingness or ability to meet or exceed international standards.
This includes things like the monetary costs of compliance, the political
power of internal constituencies that will either benefit or be harmed by
regime changes, and the institutional structure for political decision-
making.
Although we have organized our framework around an
exterual/internal distinction, we are aware that each of the forces should be
seen through additional analytical dimensions. Time analysis would
emphasize that the costs or benefits will appear differently depending on
whether an actor takes a long-term or a short-term view. Institutional
analysis would recognize that the costs and benefits become mediated and
understood through institutional structures, so that, for example, political
forces within a country will have either more or less impact depending on
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how political institutions are set up to respond to them. All of the cost and
benefits have social and cultural underpinnings.
Here then is a summary of the costs and benefits that we conjecture as
relevant variables.
A. External Forces
1. Costs
a. Threat of WTO Sanctions
How great are the costs imposed by WTO dispute resolution,
considering:
-Likelihood of enforcement (who has incentive to bring action,
how will targets be picked, will DSU system become overtaxed, will
incentive to sue be blunted by the threat of countersuits?)
-Likelihood of adverse findings (how will obligations be
interpreted; what maneuvering room is allowed under the obligations)?
Will absorbing sanctions be cheaper than compliance with dispute
resolution recommendation?
b. Threat of Unilateral Sanctions
What will be the role of unilateral threats of sanctions by IP
exporting countries in controlling compliance, considering:
-possibility that DSU limits effectiveness of threats?
-relationship between IP and other bilateral issues?
-likelihood of unilateral action (how will targets be chosen;
how is
information gathered?)
c. Role of Informal Surveillance by TRIPS Committee or Trade
Policy
Review Committee
d. Role of Informal Surveillance by National Trade Agencies
e. Role of Surveillance by Private Organizations (NGOs)
2. Benefits
a. Role of Reputation in International Community
b. Role at Millennium Round Bargaining Table
c. Role of External Aid
-training
-financial assistance
d. Role in Attracting Investment
e. Role in Facilitating Transfer of Technology
2000]
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B. Internal Forces
1. Benefits
a. Enhance Indigenous Knowledge Industries
b. Lead to Country Specifc IP (development of drugs for local
disease or art for local tastes)
c. Protect Indigenous Cultures
d. Attract Investment
e. Attract Licensed Technology
f. Advantages of Property/Rights Economy
2. Costs
a. Contextual Costs
-loss of local control
-perceived loss of sovereignty
-perceived neo-colonialism; holdover from old colonialism
b. Costs to Consumers
c. Costs to Counterfeiters
-possibility of co-opting them through favorable licensing
-addressing their political muscle
d. Systemic Costs
-diverting resources
-training
-developing property/rights consciousness
-developing new processes and remedies
Based on this articulation of the costs and benefits of intellectual
property regimes, we can begin to suggest several hypotheses for evaluation
in the symposium. For example, we can hypothesize that intellectual
property regimes are likely to be "stronger" in countries that already have
developed property and rights systems built on private remedies, where a
local industry perceives that it can benefit from stronger protection and can
translate that benefit into effective political and judicial action, where
domestic industries that will lose from intellectual property protection can
be isolated from political or judicial influence, and where intellectual
property is not thought to be a foreign import. They will also be stronger in
countries where external forces have the greatest to gain from TRIPS
enforcement, and where outsiders with something to gain are able to incite
their national governments to take action.
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By contrast, intellectual property systems are likely to be weaker in
countries where private rights and property are not culturally accepted,
where private judicial remedies are undeveloped, where there is little local
industry to support intellectual property, and where counterfeit industries
are well-entrenched or politically powerful. This does pot, of course,
exhaust the range of possibilities, but it is indicative of the combination of
factors that are probably relevant.
THE FEEDBACK EFFECT
Finally, we are conscious that the nature of compliance with
international obligations, and the cost of compliance, will have a feedback
effect on how intellectual property standards evolve. Here, two
characteristics of the international intellectual property system are
noteworthy. First, the norms in TRIPS and WIPO treaties are both
ambiguous and indeterminate, requiring continuing rearticulation as part of
the enforcement process. Second, new norms are negotiated, and old norms
renegotiated, as part of a comprehensive series of negotiations over many
subjects. Even the dispute resolution process of the WTO is in a sense an
invitation to a new round of negotiations, because compliance measures
will lead to new issues to be resolved (or settled) and because a country can
offer compensation instead of changing its intellectual property regime.
Hence, the costs of compliance become an incentive to readjust the
standards to either make the standards less costly or to seek some additional
countervailing benefit. Undoubtedly then, the nature and cost of compliance
will influence the rights, and responsibilities, that shape intellectual
property law in the future. In this connection, we will examine the process
by which standards are formulated, how states form their negotiating
strategy, and how non-government organizations, institutional structures,
and other trade issues affect negotiations.
Call for Input:
Given this framework we seek papers and comments that can be added
to out web site in the following subject areas:
Papers that seek to refine the variables we have identified and assess
them in the context of the experience that particular countries and regions
have had in implementing intellectual property systems. We hope that
these papers in applied compliance will give a good comparative basis for
understanding the context in which variables either enhance or deter
compliance.
Papers that amplify the institutional, cultural, social, and political
aspects of these variables in ways that allow us to assess the weight they
will bear in causing regimes to change.
Papers that discuss state responsibility for private conduct.
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Papers that suggest how compliance and compliance issues are likely
to affect the process of dispute resolution under TRIPS and the agenda for
new negotiations over intellectual property.
